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1 INTRODUCTION 
Innovat ing firms have to decide whether to start off  R&D projects e i ther  
internal ly or externally. By internal R&D we mean a firm's in-house R&D,  
while external R&D refers to R&D that is contracted out to external research 
organisat ions uch as universities. External R&D can be used by firms to 
overcome the l imitations of  their R&D budgets ~and the technological  risks 
associated with R&D.  F i rms can benefit f rom the scale economies of  external 
research organisat ions that can achieve a large scale in terms of  researchers 
working on a part icular  prob lem and in providing research equipment. On the 
other hand, complementar it ies between internal R&D and other activities of  a 
firm can be used to improve productivity.  Moreover,  firms may have insuffi- 
cient control  over results of  external research. Using internal R&D,  firms may 
face less danger of  an outflow of  important  informat ion to rival firms which 
prevents the innovating firm from reaping the rewards or even from recovering 
the costs of  R&D} It  may also be attractive for firms to engage in internal 
R&D paral lel  with external R&D.  Mowery (1983) argues that external R&D 
functions are a complement to rather than a substitute for internal R&D,  while 
L ink and Rees (1991) suggest hat firms can use their university-based associa- 
tions to leverage their internal R&D.  
The weight that is given to the pros and cons of  internal and external R&D 
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1 The limitations of R&D budgets may for instance arise from the indivisibility of expensive, 
specialized research equipment. 
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may depend on the firms' market structure characteristics. Limitations of 
R&D budgets are more important for small firms than for large firms, while 
firms operating in concentrated markets will put more weight upon preventing 
rival firms from getting information on research results. That is, the occurrence 
of internal and external R&D may be explained by different market structure 
characteristics and, furthermore, market structure characteristics may explain 
the share of internal or external R&D in total R&D. A generally accepted set 
of market structure characteristics has been developed in the literature in order 
to explain inter-firm levels of R&D activity, 3 but we do not know of any 
systematic, empirical analysis of the impact of market environment on internal 
vs  external R&D. 4 In the current study we shall empirically examine the deter- 
minants of the two types of R&D by separately regressing internal and external 
R&D measures for firms in Dutch manufacturing on firm size, market concen- 
tration, capital intensity, profitability, market growth, and (skilled) labour 
intensity. To examine the relative importance of external R&D, the share of 
external R&D in total R&D is regressed on market structure characteristics. 
The structure of this study is as follows. Section 2 discusses the R&D data. 
The arguments for considering the market structure characteristics used as 
determinants of internal and/or external R&D are given in section 3. Cross- 
section regression results are presented in section 4. Some concluding remarks 
are made in section 5. The results indicate differences in determinants between 
internal and external R&D. While internal R&D is significantly explained by 
market concentration, market growth, and labour intensity, external R&D is 
significantly related to firm size and market growth. Firm size, market concen- 
tration, and capital intensity significantly explain the share of external R&D. 
2 R&D DATA 
R&D intensity is defined as the number of full-time employees (FTEs) engaged 
in R&D as a percentage of total employment. 5 The data are from the '1984 
Stichting voor Economisch Onderzoek der Universiteit van Amsterdam (SEO) 
national survey on R&D and innovation in The Netherlands.' The data consist 
of internal and external R&D employment and total employment for 446 firms 
in Dutch manufacturing classified according to three digit 'Standaard Be- 
drijfsindeling' (SBI) (standard business classification) codes. Using the data for 
these 446 firms engaged in both internal and external R&D the two digit SBI 
industries' averages of firm size and internal and external R&D intensities have 
3 See Cohen and Levin (1989) and Kamien and Schwartz (1982). 
4 Recently, Kleinknecht and Reijnen (1991) and Link and Rees (1991) have studied the influence 
of market structure characteristics on R&D cooperation, but they did not compare their outcomes 
with results for internal research. 
5 See Cohen and Levin (1989) for a discussion of the different measures ofinnovation and their 
pros and cons. 
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been computed. Table 1 reports the averages for the industries for which at 
least 10 observations are available. Firms engaged in both internal and exter- 
nal R&D are usually larger firms. This is confirmed by the industries' averages 
of  firm size reported in Table 1. The mean internal and external R&D intensi- 
ties indicate that firms prefer internal to external R&D. It is not surprising that 
the paper industry and the building materials industry are found to have the 
lowest total R&D intensities (1.68 and 2.37, respectively) and that the electrical 
engineering industry and the chemical industry are found to have the highest 
total R&D intensities (6.55 and 7.15, respectively). 
3 DETERMINANTS OF INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL R&D 
There have been numerous empirical studies of  inter-firm differences in R&D 
spending. Although many candidate determinants of  R&D have been consid- 
ered, six are commonly analyzed: firm size, market concentration, capital in- 
tensity, profitability, market growth, and skilled labour. In the current study 
we measure firm size by the number of  FTEs, market concentration by the 
four-firm concentration ratio in terms of employment, capital intensity as the 
ratio of the cumulative investments in the preceding seven years to the indus- 
trial production value, profitability by the price-cost margin defined as the 
TABLE 1 - MEAN FIRM SIZE AND INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL R&D INTENSITIES 
BY TWO DIGIT INDUSTRIES a 
internal external 
industry firm size b R&D intensity ° R&D intensity ° 
Food 558.5 (1024.2) 1.842 (1.605) 0.591 (0_871) 
Textiles 421.4 (578.8) 2.547 (2.137) 1.102 (1.327) 
Lumber 308.4 (712.1) 2.346 (2.416) 0.345 (0.220) 
Paper 229.5 (158.1) 1.226 (0.799) 0.451 (0.413) 
Printing 303.2 (445.2) 1.683 (1.290) 1.005 (1.006) 
Chemicals 968.2 (4538.1) 5.811 (4.927) 1.334 (1.961) 
Rubber and Plastic 600.5 (1662.6) 4.678 (7.641) 0.953 (1.236) 
Building Materials 115.9 (112.2) 1.658 (1.334) 0.715 (0.635) 
Fabricated Metal Products 178.0 (266_2) 3.484 (3.510) 1.034 (0.995) 
Mechanical Engineering 225.0 (400.4) 4.441 (4.529) 1.026 (1.147) 
Electrical Engineering 294.6 (403.6) 5.300 (4.470) 1.245 (1.674) 
Transportation Equipment 1370.3 (2738.8) 3.022 (2.805) 0.954 (1.070) 
The industry means are unweighted averages of three digit SBI industry values. For these aver- 
ages only firms engaged in both internal and external R&D have been considered. Only the 
averages based on at least 10 observations are reported. Standard errors are listed in parentheses. 
b Firm size is defined as the number of full-time mployees (FTEs). 
° Internal (external) R&D intensities are defined as the number of FTEs engaged in internal 
(external) R&D as a percentage oftotal employment (in FTEs). 
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ratio of the industrial production value minus labour and material costs to the 
industrial production value, market growth as the percentage change in de- 
flated industrial sales, and skilled labour by the ratio of labour costs to the 
industrial production value. 
The firm size is known for each of the 446 firms. For the other explanatory 
variables, we use three digit SBI data from the DUMA (Dutch Manufacturing) 
data set of the Research Institute for Small and Medium-Sized Business (EIM) 
in The Netherlands. For these three digit SBI variables we use the averages of 
the 1981, 1982, and 1983 values for the three digit SBI industries to which the 
individual firms belong. It is unrealistic to argue that the 1983 R&D projects 
only depend on the market structure prevailing in 1983. Decisions on these 
R&D projects will often have been made in the preceding years so that the 
market structure characteristics for 1981 and 1982 may also explain the 1983 
R&D intensities. 
Large firms are more likely to engage in internal than external R&D. This 
can be justified by the financial arguments which are also suggested to justify 
the Schumpeter (1950) and Galbraith (1952) hypothesis that a large firm size is 
a necessary condition for technological innovation. 6 Internal R&D projects 
may be more expensive than external R&D projects and can therefore more 
easily be started off by large firms than by small firms. 7 Large firms usually 
have more financial resources 8 and can spread the fixed costs of internal R&D 
over a larger sales volume. Large firms can use their substantial resources to 
finance internal R&D projects in an internal fashion, while small firms need to 
convince commercial banks of the solidity of their prospective innovative pro- 
jects. 
Beside financial reasons there are also technical reasons for large firms to 
engage in internal R&D. Large firms can better use the complementarities 
between internal R&D and their other activities to improve productivity. 
Moreover, Mowery (1983) suggests that research projects of large firms are 
often more risky and complex and, therefore, require specific knowledge that 
cannot be provided for by organisations not engaged in the firms' production 
processes. The complex research projects of large firms must form the core of 
the internal R&D projects. 
6 A more bureaucratic decision-making process and less motivated scientists and entrepreneurs 
may negatively affect innovation i  large firms. See Baldwin and Scott (1987, pp. 75-88), Cohen 
and Levin (1989, pp. 1067-1074), and Kamien and Schwartz (1982, pp_ 31-33) for a discussion of 
the relationship between firm size and innovation. 
7 External R&D can also be expensive but the indivisibility problem with expensive r search 
equipment may make internal R&D less attractive than external R&D for firms having no substan- 
tial financial resources_ 
8 Hall and Weiss (1967) conclude that larger firms tend to have high profit rates_ 
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Small firms have to overcome the limitations of their R&D budget by using 
external instead of internal R&D. Kleinknecht and Reijnen (1991) and Link 
and Rees (1991) argue that it is attractive for small firms to contract R&D out 
or to cooperate with other firms. Mowery (1983) argues that the primary 
beneficiaries of services provided for by external research organisations have 
been small firms, because small firms usually cannot support an in-house 
laboratory. 9 
The two themes in Schumpeter's discussion predicting a positive effect of 
market concentration on innovation can also be interpreted as predicting 
stronger incentives to engage in internal R&D than in external R&D. 1° Firstly, 
firms should expect some form of ex post  market power in the market for their 
invented products and processes. This ex post  market power allows for non- 
competitive profits providing a reward for innovation and compensating the 
costs of R&D. 11 To assure ex post  market power firms need to prevent an 
outflow of technological information about their innovations to rival firms. 
This outflow in conjunction with the large market shares of rival firms in 
concentrated markets leads to a considerable reduction of the reward for the 
innovator. Because of the insufficient control over external research results, 
firms operating in concentrated markets may prefer internal to external R&D. 
Of course, innovations will eventually be noticed by rival firms, but internal 
R&D may be the best way to delay imitation until the products are marketed 
or new processes are in commercial use. Internal R&D may give a firm a 
valuable lead time over its rivals in a concentrated market.12 
Secondly, ex ante market power should favour innovation. Ex  ante market 
power reduces the uncertainty which usually undermines incentives to invest in 
R&D, and provides firms with additional financial resources. These additional 
financial resources are beneficial to internal R&D. Market power makes it 
financially less necessary to engage in external R&D to overcome the limited 
R&D budgets. Since the additional financial resources provided by ex ante 
market power allow for an internal financing of R&D, these resources might 
also assure the expost  market power. Kamien and Schwartz (1978, p. 252) give 
two reasons for internal financing: firstly, 'external financing may be difficult 
to obtain without substantial related tangible collateral to be claimed by the 
9 Mowery (1983) and Varcoe (1974) note that it is difficult for small firms to utilize external 
research facilities. Small firms usually do not have the in-house expertise toarticulate heir esearch 
needs and to put those needs into scientific terms. 
10 For extensive discussions ofthe impact of market power on innovation we refer to Cohen and 
Levin (1989, pp. 1074~1078) and Kamien and Schwartz (1982, pp. 27 31). 
11 The most obvious index measure for the extent of imperfect ompetition in a market is the 
degree of concentration. Of course, the concentration ratio can be a weak measure ofmarket power 
and will in practice contain substantial errors_ 
12 See Peck (1986) for a discussion of the importance of a lead time in the computer and 
semiconductor industries. 
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lender if the projects fails,' and secondly, 'the firm might be reluctant to reveal 
detailed information about the project hat would make it attractive to outside 
lenders, fearing its disclosure to potential rivals.' The four-firm concentration 
ratio is used to examine the effects of ex  ante  market power on innovation. 
If we consider the discussions in the literature of the impact of capital inten- 
sity on innovation, we would predict hat capital-intensive industries are not 
benificial to external R&D. Comanor (1967) associates entry barriers such as 
high capital intensity with market power and, from our point of view therefore, 
with high levels of internal R&D. Mansfield et al. (1977) suggest hat high 
capital intensity hampers the entry of new firms which are among the most 
important contributors to innovation. We expect that new (small) firms in 
particular will contribute to innovation by using external R&D. Capital inten- 
sity can also be seen as an indicator of scale economies. According to Galbraith 
(1952) and Scherer (1980), scale economies positively influence innovation. 
They argue that scale economies in certain parts of a firm's operation may 
provide scope economies for R&D. To exploit these scope economies internal 
R&D will be chosen instead of external R&D. 
Effects of profitability on R&D have been argued for in various studies. ]~ 
Assuming that a firm's financial position is a key factor for the choice between 
internal and external R&D, we expect a stronger positive effect of profitability 
on internal than on external R&D. A firm that makes huge profits can inter- 
nally finance the more expensive in-house R&D projects. Branch (1974, p. 
1001) argues that 'borrowing or the issuance of new equity securities is an 
unlikely source of funds for the support of R&D projects' because of the risks 
associated with R&D. 
A firm's market growth has implications for its research opportunities. 
Coate and Uri (1988) argue that rapidly growing industries assimilate and 
promote new innovations, while Acs and Audretsch (1987) note that in the 
growth stages there is no standardized concept in the market and the product 
design is subject o rapid change and evolution. ]4 Rapidly growing industries 
are therefore likely to offer rich opportunities for R&D. The implications of 
market growth for the choice between internal and external R&D are consid- 
ered by Asch and Seneca (1975) and Palmer (1972). They argue that firms in 
declining industries are more likely to collude than firms in growing industries. 
While these authors discuss a different issue, it is clear that some of their 
arguments also apply to a cooperation with external research organisations on 
R&D. Both collusion and external R&D can for instance accomplish a larger 
scale in terms of researchers working on a project and in providing research 
13 See for instance Coate and Uri (1988), Grabowski (1968), Link (1982) and Van den Berg 
(1989). 
14 Farrell and Saloner (1985) argue that an industry that is bound together by the benefits of 
standardization may be less innovative. 
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Firm Market Capital Profi- 







Firm Size 1.00 
Market Concentration 0.14 1.00 
Capital Intensity -0.05 0.06 1.00 
Profitability 0.01 0.09 0.28 1.00 
Market Growth 0.13 0.20 -0.36 0.02 
Labour Costs/Sales -0.10 -0.29 0.38 0.18 
1.00 
-0.41 1.00 
equipment. In growing markets firms may be less motivated to exploit the 
benefits of collusion or external R&D. 
Kraft (1989) and Acs and Audretsch (1988) suggest that the skill structure of 
employees i  a determinant of innovation. Firms with better trained employees 
may have more opportunities to engage in R&D, and especially in internal 
R&D. They do not need external experts to solve their problems. We assume 
that a higher ratio of labour costs to production value reflects the higher 
salaries for well trained employees. Of course the ratio is only a crude proxy for 
skilled labour.15 
4 RESULTS 
To examine whether the explanatory variables are strongly correlated and 
thereby cause problems of multicollinearity, the correlation matrix is presented 
in Table 2. Most of the correlation coefficients indicate that there are no 
problems of multicollinearity. For the variables that are strongly correlated 
with other variables, we have estimated models with a smaller set of variables 
to see whether the coefficient estimates are affected by the correlation. The 
estimation results were not significantly affected. 
The linear cross-section regression results for 446 firms in Dutch manufac- 
turing are shown in Table 3.16 The results are shown for analogous regressions 
where total R&D intensity, internal R&D intensity, external R&D intensity, 
and the share of external R&D in total R&D are the dependent variables. Since 
the errors of the internal and external R&D regressions are presumably interre- 
15 Since the ratio of labour costs to production value can also be seen as a measure of labour 
intensity, correlation with capital intensity and problems with multicolhnearity may be expected 
However, the correlation is only 0.38 and the coefficient estimates ofthe other variables are only 
slightly affected by the presence ofthis ratio in our model. 
16 Using logarithmic regression equations, the coefficient estimates are only slightly different 
from the coefficient estimates ofthe linear model. 
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TABLE 3 - LINEAR REGRESSIONS OF INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL R&D INTENSI- 
TIES (STANDARD ERRORS IN PARENTHESES) a 
Equation/ Firm Market Capital Profi- Market Labour Constant Sample R 2 
variable Size Concen- Intensity tability Growth Costs/ Size 
to be tration Sales 
explained 
1/ 
Total -0.626 4.410 b -1.622 0.642 19.619 u 9.365 b 0.675 446 0.091 
R&D (1.102) (1.012) (1.733) (4.035) (4.747) (2.760) (1,009) 
intensity 
2/ 
Internal -0.009 4.112 b -1.543 0,014 15.822 b 8.167 b 0,246 446 0,075 
R&D (0.947) (0.920) (1,542) (3.591) (4.224) (2.456) (0.897) 
intensity 
3/ 
External -0.620 b 0.350 -0.078 0.628 3.767 b 1 .198  0.429 446 0.022 
R&D (0.291) (0.283) (0_472) (1.100) (1.294) (0.752) (0_275) 
intensity 
4/ 
External -0.112 b -0.097 b 0.15l b 0.003 0.039 -0.123 0.264 u 446 0.040 
R&D (0,042) (0.041) (0.068) (0.159) (0.187) (0.109) (0.040) 
Share 
"The method of Seemingly Unrelated Regressions has been used to estimate quations 2 and 3. 
bStatistically significant at the 95% level of confidence_ 
lated, the method of seemingly unrelated regressions has been used to estimate 
the coefficients of these two regressions. 17 The low standard R2 is explained by 
the higher aggregation level of the market structure variables. Except for firm 
size, three digit industry market structure variables are used to explain R&D 
intensities of firms such that most of the explanatory variables have the same 
values for several R&D observations. 
In most R&D studies the decomposition of total R&D into internal and 
external R&D is not accounted for. That is, most authors assume that the 
determinants of internal and external R&D are the same. Our results indicate 
that this assumption can be criticized. For capital intensity and the price-cost 
margin the decomposition does not seem to be relevant; they affect neither the 
total, nor the internal or external R&D intensities. But the other market struc- 
ture characteristics onsidered have different effects on internal and external 
R&D. Equation 1 shows that a modelling of the total R&D intensity leads to 
the conclusion that firm size does not affect R&D (coefficient -0.63 with 
17 The test for heteroscedasticity proposed by White (1980) indicated that homoscedasticity 
could not be rejected. 
INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL R&D 287 
t-value -0.57) and that market concentration and the ratio of labour costs to 
sales do affect R&D (the coefficients are 4.41 and 9.37 with t-values 4.36 and 
3.39, respectively). However, a separate modelling of the internal and external 
R&D intensities indicates that firm size only significantly affects the external 
R&D intensity (coefficient -0.62 with t-value -2.13) and that market concen- 
tration and the labour-sales ratio only significantly affect the internal R&D 
intensity (the coefficients are 4.11 and 8.17 with t-values 4.47 and 3.33, respec- 
tively). Differences in effects are also indicated by the results of Table 4. Table 
4 gives the results of tests examining whether individual variables have identi- 
cal effects on internal and external R&D. F-tests reject he hypothesis of identi- 
ca/effects for market concentration, market growth, and the labour-sales ratio. 
The negative coefficients of firm size suggest hat the advantages of a large 
firm size (increasing returns to scale, scope economies) are compensated or
even dominated by the disadvantages (loss of managerial control and bureau- 
cratization of inventive activity). The positive market concentration coeffi- 
cients are pointed out by Schumpeter (1950). In growing markets R&D efforts 
seem to be higher indeed, while our proxy for skilled labour also has the 
expected positive effect on R&D. 
A separate modelling of internal and external R&D cannot provide mean- 
ingful insights into the determinants of the relative importance of the two 
forms of R&D for firms, because the resulting differences in coefficients only 
provide information on the impact of market structure characteristics on the 
absolute differences in importance between internal and external R&D. It is 
more interesting to examine the relative differences by modelling the share of 
external R&D in total R&D. 
Equation 4 of Table 3 shows that the coefficients of the external R&D share 
regression indicate that firm size, market concentration, and capital intensity 
significantly explain the relative importance of external R&D for firms. As 
expected, large finns in concentrated markets eem to prefer internal R&D to 
external R&D. The finding that capital-intensive industries favour external 
R&D is not in line with the impact of capital intensity on innovation suggested 
TABLE 4 HYPOTHESES TESTS FOR THE DIFFERENCES IN THE DETERMINANTS 
OF INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL R&D (BASED ON EQUATIONS 2 AND 3 OF TABLE 3) 
Variable a Firm Market Capital Profi- Market Labour 
Size Concen- Intensity tability Growth Costs/ 
tration Sales 
F 0.445 17.743 b 0.977 0.032 8.768 b 8.708 b
The variable ishypothesized and therefore constrained to have an identical effect on internal nd 
external R&D. 
b Statistically significant a the 95% level of confidence. 
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in the literature. However, the positive capital intensity coefficient might be 
explained by the fact that capital-intensive high-tech industries often need 
external experts to solve their problems. 
5 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Most empirical studies of the determinants of R&D have treated R&D as a 
single homogeneous activity, Consequently, little empirical information on the 
determinants of internal and external R&D is available. In the current study, 
we show that market structure characteristics influence internal and external 
R&D in a different manner. 
Many discussions on the effects of market structure characteristics on inno- 
vation are based on financial arguments. This especially applies to firm size 
and market concentration. In Schumpeter's discussion on the importance of 
firm size and market power for innovation, the opportunities to make higher 
profits are the central theme. In this study the importance of these financial 
arguments i confirmed by considering the choice between internal and exter- 
nal R&D. Since this choice depends on the financial position of a firm, negative 
effects of firm size and market power on the share of external R&D in total 
R&D are expected. 
Governments often offer firms the (subsidized) services of external research 
organisations to ensure that all firms can have the advantage of ongoing tech- 
nological developments. Especially small firms are expected to benefit from 
such research services. Our results indicate that smaller firms are indeed more 
likely to engage in external research relationships. But our results provide a 
more detailed description of the firms that are interested in such services. 
Especially firms dealing with more competition and capital-intensive produc- 
tion processes will consult external experts. 
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Summary 
DETERMINANTS OF INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL R&D: SOME DUTCH EVIDENCE 
Innovating firms can choose to engage in either internal or external R&D, or in both. In the current 
study, we shall examine internal and external R&D separately to determine empirically the market 
structure characteristics explaining the external R&D share and the differences inmarket structure 
determinants between internal and external R&D. Our results indicate that a government policy 
that aims at stimulating technological progress by offering external research facilities is particularly 
interesting for smaller, capital-intensive firms operating in less concentrated markets. 
